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NOMENCLATURE 
 
 
 
14 CFR   Code of Federal Regulations. Title 14 covers the   
    Department of Transportation which includes the   
    Federal Aviation Administration. 
   
AFCS    A system which includes all equipment to automatically  
    control the flight of an aircraft by reference to either  
    internal or external data. 
 
APU    Auxiliary Power Unit.  A small, self contained generator  
    used in aircraft to start the main engines, provide electrical  
    power, hydraulic pressure and air conditioning while the  
    aircraft is on the ground. 
 
ATP    Airline Transport Pilot.  The highest level of aircraft pilot  
    certification.   
 
EFIS    Electronic Flight Information System.  A system where  
    primary flight and navigational data are displayed on an  
    electronic display.  EFIS is designed to present all   
    information required for the current phase of a flight in a  
    compact display.  The EFIS is the central part of the glass  
    cockpit.  The system usually consists of a Primary Flight  
    Display (PFD), Multi-Function Display (MFD), and an  
    Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS)  
    display. 
 
EICAS    Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System.  Displays  
    information about the aircraft’s systems, including its fuel,  
    electrical and engine data, allowing the pilots to view data  
    in a graphical format and also alerting the crew to abnormal 
    conditions. 
 
FAR    Federal Aviation Regulation.  A portion of Title 14 CFR  
    dealing with the control and regulation of civil air   
    operations in the United States. 
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FD    Flight Director.  A device that displays visual cues on the  
    attitude indicator or PFD to the pilot directing control  
    inputs to meet the requirements for the phase of flight. 
   
FGC    Flight Guidance Computer.  The central part of the Flight  
    Management System.  It computes real-time navigational  
    data and constantly updates performance data. 
 
FMS    Flight Management System.  A computerized avionics  
    system computing flight planning, navigation, and aircraft  
    control functions.  The FMS consists of the FMC, AFCS,  
    EFIS, and the navigation system. 
 
GPS    Global Positioning System.  A satellite navigation system  
    operated by the United States.  A constellation of satellites  
    provides positional data to a GPS receiver allowing it to  
    determine its location anywhere on Earth.  It is a major  
    component of most navigational suites. 
 
ICAO    International Civil Aviation Organization.  A United  
    Nations Agency that coordinates techniques and principles  
    of international aviation procedures and regulations. 
 
INS    Inertial Navigation System.  A navigation system that  
    determines position by measuring lateral and vertical  
    accelerations placed on a reference platform prior to  
    takeoff. This system uses no outside references such as  
    GPS or ground based radio signals. 
 
JAA    Joint Aviation Authorities.  An associated body of the  
    European Civil Aviation Conference who have agreed to  
    develop common aviation safety regulations and   
    procedures.  
  
LORAN-C   LOng RAnge Navigation.  A low frequency radio   
    navigational system used by both aviation and maritime  
    users.  A precursor to GPS. 
 
MFD    Multi-Function Display.  Displays navigational and   
    weather information from multiple systems. The MFD can  
    also be used to display aircraft systems information.
 
 
 x
NMUSAF   National Museum of the United States Air Force. 
 
PFD    Primary Flight Display.  The PFD displays all information  
    critical to flight, including airspeed, altitude, attitude,  
    heading, vertical velocity and yaw.  The PFD is designed to 
    increase the pilot’s situational awareness by combining this 
    information onto one instrument instead of the six analog  
    instruments it was previously necessary to scan. 
  
PTS    Practical Test Standards.  The FAA document which  
    specifies the knowledge and skills that must be   
    demonstrated by an applicant before the issuance of an  
    airline transport certificate and/or a type rating in airplanes. 
 
SA    Situational Awareness.  A recognition and understanding of 
    your aircraft surroundings and being able to predict how  
    the aircraft fits into that picture and how things will   
    develop. 
 
TCAS    Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System.  A   
    computerized avionics system designed to reduce the  
    danger of mid-air collisions between aircraft.  It operates on 
    signals generated by the aircraft’s transponder, and other  
    aircraft in its presence. 
 
UPT    Undergraduate Pilot Training.  The U.S Air Force basic  
    flying training program lasting approximately 52 weeks.   
    Graduates are then rated as military pilots. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION, RATIONALE, AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 In the one hundred three years man has been flying heavier-than-air machines, the 
complexity of the aircraft and the systems with which they fly has increased 
exponentially.  This increase in technology has dictated a change from single-pilot 
operation to multi-pilot operation and from little or no formal training to extensive initial 
training, with formally scheduled recurrent training in those systems and an 
accompanying shift from “seat of the pants” flying to monitoring computer-generated 
systems displays as the airplane flies itself on autopilot.  Is this shift creating problems? 
 
Rationale 
 
 
The Wright Flyer of 1903 had three recording instruments installed: an  
anemometer to measure distance traveled, a stopwatch to time the flight, and a  
tachometer to record engine revolutions and propeller speed (Kelly, 1989).  The engine  
had two speeds: On and Off.  
 The period between 1910 and the end of World War I saw significant increases in 
technology.  Engines became more reliable; and with the addition of supercharging, were 
able to reach altitudes exceeding the physiological capabilities of their pilots (Miller, 
2 
1968).   Multiengine airplanes were proven to be feasible as engine size and power 
increased.  Cockpit complexity increased with airplane size, and for the most part, these 
aircraft were still flown by a single pilot.  
 The “Golden Years” between World War I and World War II were marked by  
rapid increases in technology, including the introduction of variable pitch propellers,  
instrument development allowing flight at night and in poor weather, and the shift from  
wood and fabric covered airplanes to all metal construction.  The Air Commerce Act of  
1926 was signed into law, establishing licensing procedures for both aircraft and airmen. 
As aircraft grew in size and complexity, the instrument panel became more crowded and  
potentially confusing for the pilot (Bilstein, 1994). 
 World War II accelerated the technological development of the airplane.   
Innovations such as cabin pressurization were put into production as soon as engines 
were developed capable of providing the required power necessary to operate the 
systems.  
 The complexity of the four-engine airplane grew so rapidly that two pilots could 
no longer manage the cockpit without additional crewmembers.  Flight controls were 
now pneumatically or hydraulically actuated and amplified as direct cable and pushrod  
controls were abandoned.   A flight engineer was added to the crew specifically to  
manage the powerplants and ancillary systems, thus freeing the pilots to fly the airplane  
instead of having to divert their attention to managing the health and operation of the  
highly complex engines and sub-systems (Brooks, 1961).   The cockpit now was even  
more complex and crowded.  Instrumentation differed from airplane to airplane, which  
added to the pilots’ workload. Standardization and automation were on the horizon, but  
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not yet available.  
 The end of the Second World War introduced the first of the pressurized  
intercontinental propeller-driven transports developed from the experience derived from  
long-range bomber production and operations (Brooks, 1961, Miller and Sawers, 1968).   
Industry standardization was reinforced by the establishment of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1947, setting common levels of training and experience 
for the licensing of pilots.  Airborne communications and electronics were also 
experiencing rapid changes. Vacuum tube electronics evolved into transistor electronics, 
which were soon replaced by integrated circuitry.  Electronic miniaturization reduced the 
size and weight of airborne equipment, which led to an exponential growth in both 
availability and practical capability.  Autopilot and navigational technologies were 
refined to the point they could now be coupled to the airplane after takeoff.  Cockpit 
automation was beginning to be developed, further increasing the pilot’s workload 
(Brooks, 1961). 
 Gradually, from the late sixties and at an ever-increasing rate, electronics started 
to fulfill functions previously performed by electromechanical, hydraulic, or pneumatic 
systems.  Each new aircraft had more on-board electronics for communication, 
navigation and other functions.  Weather radar became standard on transport category 
aircraft. An Electronic Flight Instruments System (EFIS) and an Engine Indicating and 
Crew Alerting System (EICAS) replaced cockpit instruments that had been 
electromechanical since the 1930s.  Electronic systems were no longer limited to 
communication and navigation only.  Electronic Engine Control Systems, Inertial 
Navigation Systems (INS), Automatic Flight Control Systems (AFCS), Traffic alert and 
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Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) were all developed as a result of the rapid growth 
and development of digital electronics and the availability of modern airborne computer 
technology with its associated airborne software packages.  By the 1970s, cockpits were 
becoming more and more automated and pilots were charged with the dual 
responsibilities of managing the systems as well as flying the airplane (Weiner, Kanki, 
Helmreich, 1993) (Stewart, 1992). 
Pilot certification by the Federal Aviation Authority was changing as well.  
Heretofore, pilot certification was based on the pilot’s ability to fly the airplane under   
varying conditions. An Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) of the 1930s was required to 
demonstrate his ability to maintain control of the airplane with one or more engines shut 
down, electrical system malfunctions, and other distractions as selected by the examiner.  
The primary emphasis, however, was always on flying skills and aircraft control (DOC, 
1937).  The ATP of the 1940s was required to perform the same tasks with the addition of 
hydraulic systems and radio navigation. As ground based navigational systems matured, 
the testing requirements evolved to match the increased aircraft and avionics capabilities 
available to the aircrew, but still the primary emphasis was on the ability of the pilot to 
demonstrate flying skills and positive aircraft control (DOC, 1951).   The ATP Practical 
Test Standards (PTS) for the year 1967 listed 31 items the candidate would be tested 
over, but “smoothness and coordination” were the primary criteria for rating the 
candidate’s flying skills (FAA, 1957).  Between 1988 and 2001, emphasis moved from 
“use of available automation” to demonstrating competency in Flight Management 
Systems (FMS) procedures and “effective use of all available resources” (FAA, 2001).  
The current ATP flight check does include basic airwork: steep turns, approach to stalls, 
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and unusual attitude recoveries, but the primary emphasis is on the effective use of all 
available resources and the effective use of automation (FAA, 2001). 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
 
The constantly increasing automation in modern aircraft may have resulted in 
basic and fundamental piloting skills being lost or degraded due to over-reliance on 
automation.  The problem is exacerbated by the requirement to demonstrate proficiency 
in operating all installed equipment and automation during initial and recurrent flight 
checks, leading to the tendency of a pilot’s trying to program his way out of a problem 
rather than reverting to basic flying skills to resolve the situation. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to ask aviation experts to explore the extent of the 
problem and examine how the required flying skills necessary to basic flying safety are 
being relegated to secondary importance due to over-reliance on, and the testing 
requirement to show effective use of, automation.   
 
Objective of the Study 
 
To achieve the purpose of the study, aviation training experts were asked to 
explore to what extent basic piloting skills are being relegated to secondary importance in 
crew-served aircraft, by asking the aviation training experts, “How does the requirement 
in the Special Emphasis Areas of the Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) Practical Test 
Standard (PTS) to demonstrate proficiency in operating all installed equipment and 
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automation during initial and recurrent flight checks lead to over-reliance on automation, 
and what actions can be taken by the training community to correct this possible trend?” 
 
Assumptions of the Study 
 
 To achieve the purpose of the study, the following assumptions were made: 
1. Respondents provided thoughtful insights during each round of the study from 
the viewpoint of their experience as experts in aviation training and testing.  
2. Respondents’ views represented the views of other aviation specialists in their 
areas and provided a rich source of data.  
3. Respondents provided their best individual professional opinions to each 
question and not a statement that reflected current practices within their 
organizations. 
 
Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
 
This study was conducted from April 25, 2006, when the question was first sent to 
the respondents, through August 11, 2006, when the final responses were received.   
  The scope of this study was limited to select respondents who were in 
instructional and/or evaluation positions within the business aviation industry.   
 The study was limited to those business class aircraft usually referred to as 
“corporate,” requiring a type rating by the Federal Aviation Administration. 
 The study was further limited by the Delphi Study factor that consensus is neither 
expected, nor necessarily desirable (Linstone and Turoff, 1975).     
 An additional limitation of the Delphi method was that the researcher had no 
control over the commitment of the respondents to participate in the complete study. 
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Significance of the Study 
 
 
 In late 1982 when the Boeing 757/767 series aircraft first entered service with 
industry, a significant item of interest and concern was the two-place cockpit.  
Previously, all aircraft of this size and weight category had included a flight engineer as 
an integral member of the flight deck, but now the position was conspicuous by its 
absence (Buck, 1994, Wiener and Nagel, 1988).  The state of the art in microprocessing 
and software development had reached the stage where automation was capable of 
monitoring aircraft systems in addition to other functions of navigation and flight 
management.  The technological capability that allowed Boeing to build this series of 
aircraft was also available to the manufacturers of corporate aircraft, and the first series 
of "glass cockpit” business jets entered the market.      
 Cockpit automation has generally been well received by the aviation community; 
however, some have expressed concern that the aircrews could put too much faith in 
automation to the detriment of primary flying skills.  Several studies have been 
accomplished to this end with airline and military crews.  This study, however, will be 
focused on the business aviation (corporate) crew force operating under Parts 91, and/or 
135, of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). 
8 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
Overview 
 
 In the one hundred three years man has been flying heavier-than-air machines, the 
complexity of the aircraft and the systems with which they fly has increased 
exponentially.  This increase in technology has dictated a change from single-pilot 
operation to multi-pilot operation and from little or no formal training to extensive initial 
training with formally scheduled recurrent training in those systems and an 
accompanying shift from “seat of the pants” flying to monitoring computer-generated 
systems displays as the airplane flies itself on autopilot.  Is this shift creating problems? 
 In the one hundred three years the airplane has been a part of civilized society, its 
technology has continually grown and matured.  As with any growth and maturation 
process, the airplane has become a more complex machine.  
 
Development of Aerial Technology 
 
 
The first philosophies of flight training emphasized manually controlling the 
aircraft.  Initially, the first changes were mechanical improvements to existing technology 
such as the use of a pulley to reduce friction, or a bell crank to increase mechanical 
advantage to a flight control surface.  Pilots had little trouble adapting to these changes as 
they were easily incorporated into the already familiar tasks required to safely pilot the 
9 
aircraft.  Practical limitations to the airplane’s utility were readily identified.  
Aircraft instrumentation was, at best, primitive.  The 1903 Wright Flyer had three 
recording instruments installed ⎯ the most important of which was an anemometer to 
measure the distance traveled through the air, the second was a stopwatch to measure the 
time airborne, and the third was a tachometer to record propeller speed (Kelly, 1989).  
 
 
Figure 1.  Wright Flyer Instrumentation 
 (Courtesy The Wright Experience) 
 
  The need for improved engine capability and reliability was quickly realized and 
significant efforts were expended in producing more powerful and reliable powerplants.  
Kelly (1989) recorded that the engine on the 1903 Flyer had two speeds: On and Off.  By 
the summer of 1908 when Wilbur Wright was demonstrating the Flyer A to the 
Europeans in France, engine capabilities had improved enough to provide variable 
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throttle positions. However, reliability was still a matter of major concern.  Two engine 
types were in use during this period.  The first was the in-line, which took its origins from 
the automotive industry (Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2. Curtiss water cooled engine, 1904 (Courtesy  NMUSAF) 
 
The second type in use was the radial engine (Figure 3) which had been 
developed specifically as an aircraft powerplant.  The radial engine was developed to 
provide a higher power-to-weight ratio than was possible with the in-line engine.  It 
relied on air flow to provide cooling and was generally 35% lighter than its in-line 
competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Typical rotary engine of the 1910-1920s (Courtesy NMUSAF) 
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 By 1914, the cockpit of the well equipped trainer, such as the Curtis JN-4D Jenny 
(Figure 4) included a recording tachometer, magnetic compass, oil temperature and 
pressure gauge, and a coolant temperature gauge (Jordanoff, 1936).  Airspeed was 
determined by the sound of the slipstream passing through the wing struts and bracing 
wires.  Cockpit complexity had increased slightly, but not significantly, as most pilots 
had no problem understanding additions to primary engine instrumentation.  
 
 
Figure 4. JN-4 Aircraft Cockpit (Courtesy NMUSAF) 
 
 
The period between 1910 and the end of World War I saw significant increases in 
technology.  Engines became more reliable and with the addition of supercharging, were 
able to reach altitudes exceeding the physiological capabilities of the pilots to remain 
conscious.  One significant advance was the introduction of multiengine aircraft.  The 
majority of these machines were twin engine, but examples of three-, four- , and even 
eight engine aircraft were flying.  Cockpit complexity increased with aircraft size, and, 
for the most part, these aircraft were still flown by a single pilot (Christy & Wells, 1987).  
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In August of 1918 the U.S. Post Office took over airmail service from the United 
States Army Air Service (Jackson, 1982).  The postal service was largely equipped with 
World War I surplus deHavilland DH-4 aircraft, built for combat, not long-haul freight 
operations.  The requirement to maintain a regular schedule regardless of the weather 
conditions illustrated one of the most serious limitations of the airplane: the inability to 
safely fly at night or in inclement weather conditions when the pilot had no visible 
horizon to maintain attitudinal orientation (Christy & Wells, 1987).  Ground navigational 
aids were being developed and installed as early as late 1921, when ten ground radio 
stations were placed along the San Francisco-New York route which lead to 
transcontinental airmail service by mid 1924  (Leary, 1985).  
 
The Golden Age of Technology 
 
 
The period between World Wars One and Two is often referred to by many 
historians as “The Golden Age of Aviation” (Bilstein, 1994).  Barnstorming, air races, 
military long distance flights, and polar exploration were frequent news stories.  Many 
individual acts of courage were attempted: some succeeded, others did not and lives were 
lost (Bilstein, 1994).  Behind all these efforts, aviation was the driving force pushing 
technology to the limit.  The Ford Trimotor A-4T aircraft was introduced in June 1926.  It 
was the first successful American built metal skinned aircraft and carried up to eight 
passengers in an enclosed cabin even though the two pilots were in an open cockpit.  
Later versions incorporated closed cockpits and increased passenger-carrying capability.  
By 1927 the introduction of the Sperry gyroscopic horizon added to the available 
instruments a pilot could include in the cockpit, along with the directional gyro.  By 
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1929, instrument flying had become practical: The cockpit of a well-equipped mail or 
passenger airplane would have the “basic six” flight instruments: two or three 
navigational instruments, and at least six engine instruments (Jordanoff, 1936).   
The two-position variable pitch propeller was introduced by Hamilton-Standard in 
1930 and was in common use by 1932.  Curtiss-Wright introduced the electric variable-
pitch propeller in 1930 and marketed it first to the military before offering it to 
commercial aviation in 1932 (Miller & Sawers, 1968).  The cockpit was becoming a 
more complex environment for the pilot.  As aircraft increased in size and capability, the 
instrument panel grew in complexity and number of instruments until space to install 
them became a true challenge for the engineer designing the cockpit (Wiener and Nagel, 
1988).   Multiengine aircraft being designed for passenger service were now being 
designed with two pilots in the cockpit to combat the fatigue of long flights, even though 
only one might have flight instruments on the panel in front of him.  The right seat pilot 
often had only the engine instruments on his side of the aircraft. 
On May 20, 1926, President Calvin Coolidge signed the Air Commerce Act of 
1926 into law.  The law required, among other things, the government to license pilots 
and to issue airworthiness certificates for aircraft and major aircraft components.  
Additionally, the Act prescribed safety rules for air traffic and to investigate accidents.  
The first of these regulations became effective on December 31.  A significant provision 
of the law was that all pilots engaging in interstate commerce were required to obtain 
either an air transport or industrial pilot license, or both (Wells, 1984).  The industrial 
license was a category of commercial license.  Until this time, there were no formal 
licensing procedures.  The military had in place a formal training program and designated 
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individuals as rated pilots upon completion of flying training.  There were civilian flying 
schools that, upon graduation, would award a title of “pilot,” but there was no formal 
standardization.  It was also possible to be self-taught since many who acquired war 
surplus airplanes after the World War I had taught themselves (Christy & Wells, 1987).  
The Aero Club of America had been issuing licenses as an adjunct arm of the Federation 
Aeronautique Internationale, but this was not federally recognized.  The Act established 
the Bureau of Air Commerce to enforce the regulations and established the Government’s 
role in commercial aviation.  
In February 1931, the Department of Commerce mandated that all passenger 
flights in excess of five hours or carrying eight or more passengers would require a co-
pilot.  Initial pilot licenses were classed according to aircraft weight.  Class 1 was for 
aircraft not more than 3,500 pounds maximum weight.  Class 2 was for aircraft between 
3,500 and 7,000 pounds gross weight.  Class 3 was designated for aircraft over 7,000 
pounds gross weight.  Each class was further subdivided into four sections, based on 
single or multi-engines, and open cockpit or enclosed cabin.  A Class 3D license entitled 
the pilot to operate a multi-engine, cabin class airplane over 7,000 pounds gross weight 
(DOC, 1929).  Aircraft certification standards for passenger airplanes in 1936 required, as 
set forth by Aeronautical Bulletin 7 – J,  
… (1) A bank and turn indicator,  (2) An instrument that will indicate degree of 
bank and pitch . . . (3) An instrument that will indicate the amount of turn,   (4) A 
compass, properly damped and compensated,  (5) An airspeed indicator, with 
electrically heated pitot tube or equivalent,  (6) A climb indicator,  (7) A sensitive 
altimeter . . . adjustable for barometric pressure, (8) A free air thermometer . . . 
with an indicating dial in the cockpit,  (9) A clock,  (10) A complete set of engine 
instruments   (DOC, Air Commerce Regulation 7-J, 1936, pp. 3,4).   
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Additionally, the Bulletin called for separate power sources for the instruments as 
well as lighting requirements for night operations. 
As airplanes grew more complex and pilot workloads increased, manufacturers 
began to make provisions for a copilot to provide support to the pilot, to reduce workload 
and reduce the probability of errors.  The original concept of the two-place cockpit of 
1932 was to place the directional gyro and the artificial horizon in the center of the 
instrument panel where it was visible to both the pilot and copilot.  The pilot was 
provided with a turn and bank indicator as the primary instrument on his panel, supported 
by an altimeter, vertical velocity indicator, airspeed indicator altimeter, and radio 
compass.  The magnetic compass was generally located above the instrument panel 
visible to both pilot and copilot.  The Boeing Model 247 airliner and early models of the 
B-17 used this format, as did Douglas and Consolidated (Boeing, 1985, Cameron, 1999). 
 
Figure 5. Douglas DC-3, 1937 (Courtesy NMUSAF) 
 
 
The Effect of World War Two on Technology 
   
World War Two accelerated advancements in aviation technology and the design 
of new aircraft.  Range, speed, maneuverability and load carrying capabilities were 
improved. as new designs went into production  By the end of 1947, all the basic 
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technology for modern aviation had been developed (Wells, 1984).  The fallout of 
military research and development in jet engine technology, high-speed aerodynamics, 
and radio and radar technologies was decisive in the growth of commercial aviation.  
With all the new and varied technologies developed, airliners were larger, faster, 
pressurized and even more complex for the crews to operate. The Flight Engineer was 
now an integral part of the crew, charged with the responsibility of operating the engines 
at peak efficiency throughout the flight.  Additionally, he was responsible for the 
oversight and operation of the hydraulic and electrical systems. In this cockpit, the pilots 
had a set of throttle levers for power adjustment, but all else was managed by the Flight 
Engineer.  (Figure 6) 
 
Figure 6.  Douglas C-124, 1950 (Courtesy NMUSAF) 
 
Chuck Yeager notes that his fighter aircraft of World War Two carried 
approximately 50 pounds of electronics but the new jet (of 1950) carried 1,500 pounds of 
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sophisticated electronics and the cockpit of this era was “straight out of Buck Rogers” 
(Yeager, 1986).  Figure 7 illustrates Yeager’s 1945 cockpit of the North American  
P-51 compared to the cockpit of the 1950 North American F-86, the “Buck Rogers” 
airplane. 
                                P-51, 1945              (Courtesy NMUSAF)     F-86, 1950 
                                  Figure 7.  Cockpit Comparison 
 
Perhaps the best example of military-civilian technology transfer was the Boeing 
KC135, developed in 1955 as an aerial tanker to refuel jet bombers in flight  Redesigned 
and introduced in 1958 as the Boeing 707 airliner, it became the first U.S. passenger jet 
and was widely considered the mainstay of jet transportation until the B727 was 
introduced in 1963.  Boeing introduced the B747 in 1970 and McDonnell-Douglas the 
DC-10 in 1971⎯ both aircraft commercial outgrowths of the competition for military 
contracts.  All four of these aircraft required a flight engineer as well as two pilots to 
form the basic flight crew. 
Just as the mechanical aspects of aviation were evolving, the electronic side was 
experiencing rapid growth.  Analog computers were replacing some electro-mechanical 
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functions on the aircraft.  Basic automation was beginning to enter the cockpit: autopilot 
functions were coupled to early digital computers.  The small size of the read-only 
memory units of the early computers resulted in limited capability; however, as 
miniaturization and programming technologies advanced, so did the capability.  In the 
late 1970s, the LORAN-C navigational system became fully operational for overland use 
between the East and West coasts of the United States.  It was then possible to program a 
course by entering waypoints via latitude and longitude coordinates into the control unit 
and provide this information to the autopilot (Clausing, 1992).   
Early automated cockpits had simple electromechanical flight and navigation 
instruments with a basic autopilot and Flight Director (FD).  Aircraft information was 
presented on several individual instruments.  The pilot had the primary responsibility of 
manually controlling the aircraft while monitoring the flight progress with rudimentary 
computer support.  The next generation aircraft integrated the basic autopilot and 
rudimentary computer-based navigational support with the FD.  This became the concept 
behind the Flight Management System (FMS) (Clausing, 1992).  With increased 
computer memory and processing speeds, the next generation aircraft realized a major 
evolutionary step in automation.  Systems that were previously independent were 
integrated with the autopilot to form the FMS.  Aircraft operating parameters were 
programmed into the Flight Management Computer (FMC) along with an updateable 
navigational database.  Using accurate positional information from a combination of long 
and short-range navigational sources, and integrated performance parameters, the data are 
presented to the pilot on the Primary Flight Display (PFD), an Electronic Flight 
Information System (EFIS) system and a Multi-Function Display (MFD) showing 
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positional information, terrain data and weather radar displays.  System automation 
information is displayed on an Engine Indicating and, Crew Alerting System (EICAS) to 
complete the cockpit display.  As the FMS capabilities increased, the flight and 
navigational instruments were also being computerized.  Using inputs from the FMC and 
other sources, the individual attitude indicator and directional gyro were melded into a 
single PFD and presented on a single cathode ray tube.  Flight control inputs were entered 
on a Flight Guidance Controller (FGC) to command the FD to follow desired flight 
profiles.   The glass cockpit had arrived: flight instruments were displayed on the PFD: 
engine, fuel and systems status on the EICAS: and navigational data on the MFD.  All of 
this data is generated by one or more computers onboard the aircraft.  Even though the 
pilot and copilot systems are separate and required to be able to stand alone, the Federal 
Aviation Administration requires a mechanical or battery powered backup attitude 
direction indicator, airspeed indicator and altimeter in all glass cockpits (FAR/AIM, 
2006). 
 
Pilot Training Requirements to Meet the Glass Cockpit 
 
 
The trend toward the automated cockpit flight decks – “the glass cockpit” – has 
had a major impact on commercial aviation.  Generally, the reception has been positive 
and has provided several significant benefits such as fuel efficiency, increased 
navigational accuracy and precision, and the more efficient use of limited cockpit “real 
estate” (Wiener, 1999).  Current training philosophies stress the efficient use of 
automation to control flight path and aircraft energy. For the purposes of this study, we 
define the automated cockpit as an integrated system consisting of a FMS, a FGC, and an 
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EICAS. Considerable training is required to become proficient in the operation of an 
automated cockpit (Weiner, 1989). 
 
Pilot or Manager 
 
 
The use of automation may have come, however, with an unintended price.   
Crews may be trying to program their way out of trouble when the best course of action 
would be to disregard the automation and hand fly the aircraft out of the situation 
(Cooper, et al, 1980).  A classic example of this occurrence is the crash of American 
Airlines Flight 965 in December, 1995, when the crew, after a missed approach and 
apparent loss of situational awareness, failed “to revert to basic radio navigation at the 
time when the FMS-assisted navigation became confusing and demanded an excessive 
workload in a critical phase of flight”(NTSB, 1966).  The airplane flew into the side of a 
mountain, killing 156 of the 160 souls on board.  The 1983 loss of an Eastern Air Lines 
L-1011 in the Florida swamps was caused by the autopilot becoming disconnected while 
the crew was distracted troubleshooting a possible landing gear malfunction (NTSB, 
1984).  Other instances of mismanagement include the Air New Zealand DC-10 flight 
into Mount Erebus, Antarctica, in November, 1979.  The crew disconnected the altitude 
hold function of the autopilot to descend below an undercast, and then manually put the 
aircraft on a heading directly towards the mountain not realizing the waypoint selected 
would take them directly to the mountain instead of along side as they expected (Maurino 
et al, 1998). 
Increased automation has raised concern among some pilots, safety officials and 
training professionals due to the considerable complexity of the modern glass cockpit.  
Design-related errors are also a large area of concern. 
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Design Deficiencies 
 
 
Design deficiencies leading to pilot error accidents have been a major concern 
ever since World War Two.  A number of bomber accidents were traced to the fact that 
the landing gear handle and flap handle were placed side by side and were similar in 
looks and touch, resulting in crews who raised the gear on landing roll instead of the 
flaps.  The end results were the same: a shortened landing roll ⎯ but the procedure 
clearly needed refinement (Cameron, 1999). 
In recent years, a series of pilot-error accidents have focused on the requirement 
for a review of the FMS operability capabilities by both the human factor and aircrew 
training specialists (Wiener and Nagel, 1988).  Both Boeing and FAA data show human 
error as a significant factor in aircraft accidents.  Boeing data shows that 56% of the hull-
loss accidents between 1959 and 2005 involved aircrew mistakes.  Design-related error is 
a component of this factor (Boeing, 2006).  The FAA states that the majority of aircraft 
accidents are due to human error (NTSB, 2004).   
Over the past three decades, avionics advancements introduced increasingly 
sophisticated technology into the cockpit.   These advancements were made on the 
premise of increasing safety and providing the operator with improved economic benefits 
(Stewart, 1992).   
First, automation would accomplish the routine monitoring functions of aircraft 
operations, thus freeing the crew for the tasks of monitoring flight progress, problem 
solving and decision making, and thereby increasing safety.  Decision-making would be 
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improved by ensuring that the crew had the best relevant flight and systems data available 
to make the required decision (Weiner and Nagel, 1988). 
Economic benefits were to be achieved from several factors.  Crew size could be 
reduced by automation of some crew tasking.  Additionally, solid state avionics and 
display systems would provide economic returns by improved reliability and reduced 
maintenance.  Finally, automation would provide trend monitoring of high value systems 
such as engines and auxiliary power units (APUs) (Weiner et al, 1993).   
Modern avionics have accomplished most, if not all, of these economic goals, but 
their safety effectiveness is a subject for dispute.  It is generally accepted that the 
automated features of flight control systems can improve a crew’s situational awareness 
by reducing workload.  However, the same systems that compensate for equipment 
malfunctions or for unusual flight conditions can seriously reduce situational awareness if 
the automated system masks the occurrence or does not clearly notify the crew as to what 
actions are being taken in response to the malfunction (FAA, 1996).  Aircraft design must 
be such that the aircrew can expect easily recognizable data to facilitate decision making 
for all aspects of the flight. Additionally, this design must assist the flight crew under 
emergency or abnormal situations when things are not as expected and safety depends on 
quick and correct actions by the crew (FAA, 1996).     
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In the one hundred three years man has been flying heavier-than-air vehicles, the 
complexity of the aircraft and the systems with which they fly has increased 
exponentially.  This increase in technology has dictated a change from single-pilot 
operation to multi-pilot operation and from little or no formal training to extensive initial 
training with formally scheduled recurrent training in those systems, and an 
accompanying shift from “seat of the pants” flying to monitoring computer-generated 
systems displays as the airplane flies itself on autopilot.  Is this shift creating problems 
with flying safety? 
 
Overview 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore the possibility that the Federal Aviation 
Administration Practical Test Standard (FAA, 2001) requirement for a pilot to 
demonstrate the ability to use all installed avionics equipment during a type certification 
examination or during mandatory recurrent training may have a detrimental effect on 
basic flying skills.   
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Intuitively, the logical source for this information would be the pilot community 
flying aircraft that require type ratings.  However, in this case, the question, if asked of 
the users, might result in unclear and ambiguous responses due to the wide spectrum of 
operations: i.e., contract freight, charter, corporate, fractional, or owner operated.  In 
order to capture an over-arching view of the question, it was considered necessary to 
move the question to the instructional and evaluation levels where the bias of operation 
could be neutralized.   
A Delphi technique was used to explore the issues for this study. 
 
Rationale for Delphi 
 
 
The Delphi technique was developed in the late 1940s by the RAND Corporation 
as a method to forecast the application of advancing military technologies (Dalkey, 
1967).  Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer postulated that if a panel of experts were asked 
to give their opinions of what the future of a specific subject might hold, then a 
reasonable idea might be formed by their consensus. Buckley (1995, p. 17) quotes Cary 
and Salmon’s definition of the Delphi technique from their July 1976 Agricultural 
Extension Research report as a “tool for discovering agreement, and discovering 
differences rather than forcing consensus.”  According to Kaynak, Bloom, and Leibold 
(1994), “The Delphi technique attempts to make constructive and systematic use of 
informed intuitive judgment” (p.19).  Despite its original purpose, Adams (1980) reports 
that an early use of the system was to check the reliability of horse racing handicappers. 
The more serious use, to postulate the number of atomic weapons the Soviet Union 
would require to cripple the industrial capability of the United States was reported by 
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Andranovich (1995) and Baker (1988). The technique was further refined during the 
1950s by adding the additional feature of controlled feedback (Jones and Twiss, 1978).  
Dalkey and Helmer (1993) elaborated on this addition in their article in the April issue of 
Management Science.  Buckley (1995) states that the Delphi technique as modified is 
used to garner judgments and information from experts to facilitate decision-making, 
planning and problem solving.  The primary purpose of the technique is the reliable and 
creative discovery of ideas or the collection of sufficient information for decision making 
or policy determination.  The Delphi technique is used to “… identify problems, define 
needs, establish priorities, and evaluate solutions” (Borg and Gall, 1979).  It utilizes 
written answers collected from a group of participating subject matter experts and is 
characterized by several iterations with feedback to the participants.  According to 
Winzenried (1977), the Delphi technique would be selected to investigate the subjective 
situation of an individual’s reaction to a changing work situation.  It is designed to collect 
expert opinions as independent individual ideas on a debated topic, offering structure and 
validity without an oppressive formal framework that would not allow for personal 
subjective considerations.  Hinks and McNay (1999) view the Delphi as being used when 
one or more of the following situations may exist: (a) the situation is emotionally 
charged, (b) when a decision is opinion-based, (c) when there is need for expert opinion 
and the experts are not centrally located, and/or (d) when better results might be achieved 
if the experts did not meet face to face.  The simplest method to work around an 
emotionally charged situation is to keep the emotionally involved parties separated.  The 
same application is viable when the decision will be opinion based.  Any time a group of 
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experts convenes for a meeting, the possibility of personality conflicts is present.  The 
Delphi addresses this issue by insuring the anonymity of the respondents.   
The primary characteristic of the technique that will facilitate this investigation is 
that the individually generated ideas of the respondents will produce a high quantity of 
ideas as follows: 
1. The process of writing responses to the question requires the respondents to 
submit well-reasoned, specific ideas. 
2. Behavior is proactive because the respondents cannot react to others’ verbal 
ideas. 
3. The isolation and anonymity of the respondents provide insulation from 
pressures to conform. 
4. Pooling of individual ideas and judgments aids the equality of the participants. 
5. The Delphi process tends to conclude with a sense of accomplishment and 
closure. 
6. The Delphi technique is valuable for obtaining ideas from geographically 
separated experts (Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafson, 1986). 
 
The Delphi Panel 
 
 
Selecting the panel of experts is critical to the validity and reliability of the study 
(Williams and Webb, 1994).  Goodman (1987) as well as Walker and Selfe (1996) point 
out that the validity of a Delphi study is measured by the accuracy of the panel selection. 
Weatherman and Swenson (1974) said that the panel must be representative, 
appropriate, competent, and committed.   Sumsion (1998) states that “it is important to 
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recruit individuals who have knowledge of the topic and are willing to dedicate the time 
to this discussion.”  
The database for potential respondents was constructed by cross-referencing 
recommendations from the chief training officers of four nationally recognized aviation 
training facilities (Leedy, 1974).  Each was asked to nominate ten of their instructors 
and/or evaluators as potential members of the Delphi Panel.  These individuals were 
required to be current in at least one aircraft; and currently be or have previously been 
qualified as an instructor, standardization or check pilot, or evaluator in a business class 
airplane requiring a type rating to operate.  Each facility provided a minimum of ten 
names and these individuals were contacted to determine their willingness to participate 
in the study (Appendix B).  However, one training center withdrew its participation prior 
to the start of the study. 
 
Pilot Testing 
 
 
The study was designed to be emergent throughout all iterations and the 
respondents were unaware of the identities of the other panel members.  Sellitz, 
Wrightman, and Cook (1981) pointed out the difficulty of developing questionnaires and 
rating scales.  Since this Delphi study required expertise in both airmanship and 
examination requirements, the field of potentially available experts and respondents was 
somewhat limited in number. The three major training facilities nominated ten instructors 
or evaluators for consideration as panel members.  Once the question for the study was 
developed, 10 of the 30 recommended individuals were randomly selected to validate the 
appropriateness of the question (Helmar, 1966).  These individuals were then removed 
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from the pool of potential respondents.  Each of the remaining candidates was then 
contacted and invited to participate in the study.  Minor changes in wording suggested by 
the validation process were incorporated into the final version of the question presented 
to the panel. 
 
Population of the Panel 
 
 
 Research by Ulschak (1983) and Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafsen (1975), 
suggest a range of 10 to 20 Delphi participants as the ideal size of the panel.  Potential 
participants were identified and invitations extended, soliciting participation until a 
suitable panel was assembled.  All selected members met the requirements detailed in the 
sub-section “The Delphi Panel.” 
 
Qualifications of Respondents 
 
 
Respondents were selected on the basis of their position in the aviation training 
industry and their extensive background in business and corporate aviation as well as 
their recognized expertise in aircrew training and evaluation.  Additionally, all of them 
met the four criteria as outlined by Delbecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1986) of: 
 1.  Personal involvement, 
 2.  Pertinent information to share, 
 3.  Motivation to complete the study, and  
 4.  Belief they will gain from the experience. 
 The classic Delphi requires expertise in the diverse areas of the subject under 
scrutiny in order to seek clarification of the elements of the research question.  The 
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respondents selected were all experienced practitioners of the industry and recognized as 
known experts in their aircraft.   
All respondents were ATP-rated pilots.  Eight were initially taught to fly by the 
military; eight were trained through the civilian process.  Three of the eight military 
pilots remained on active service until eligible for retirement with at least twenty years 
experience before beginning their career in business aviation.  Those three all had 
extensive experience as military flight instructors and examiners.  The other five served 
their mandatory commitment (usually five years) and then joined the civil aviation 
workforce.  Two members enjoyed full careers with major U. S airlines.  Two had 
experience with regional airlines.   
The lowest number of flight hours logged by any respondent was between 4,000 
and 5,000 hours.  Three had over 10,000 hours.  The junior member of the group had 
over 11 years experience while the most experienced checked in with over 50 years.  
Averaging both the years experience and flight hours logged resulted in an average of 29 
years and 9,975 flight hours.  Table 1 summarizes the respondents’ qualifications. 
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TABLE I 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS’ QUALIFICATIONS 
 
Categories of Qualifications   n = 16              Percent 
 
Background Experience (some respondents have multiple areas of experience) 
 Civilian (no military experience)     8      50.00 
 Major Airline        2      12.50 
 Regional Airline       2      12.50 
 Military        8      50.00 
 Charter/Fractional       7      43.75 
 
Current Position  
 Instructor Qualified     16    100.00 
Training Center Evaluator (FAA)   16    100.00 
 Type Rating Examiner (JAA)      8      50.00 
 
Flight Hours 
 1,200  – 5,000        1        6.25 
 5,001  – 10,000       8                  50.00 
 10,001 – 15,000       5       31.25 
 15,001 -        2      12.50 
 
Type Ratings Held 
 1  –  4         3      18.75 
 5  – 10        11      68.75 
 11 – 15          2      12.50 
 16 -           1        6.25 
  
Years in Aviation  
 10 – 20           6       37.50 
 21 – 30           3       18.75 
 31 – 40           5        31.25 
 41 -            4        25.00 
 
Published            5         31.25 
 
Formal Education Level 
 Associate Degree         3         18.75 
 Bachelor’s Degree       10          62.50 
 Advanced Degree         3           18.75 
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 Twenty potential respondents were invited to participate in the study.  All 20 had 
been previously contacted by telephone (Appendix B) and had expressed interest in the 
study.  After contacting the potential respondents by telephone, the consent form 
(Appendix C) was e-mailed to each individual.  Sixteen positive responses were returned 
and became the panel.   
One day prior to the start of the study, the notification to expect the question was 
e-mailed to each of the 16 positively responding respondents (Appendix D).  The 
purposes of this notification were to alert the respondents to expect the Delphi question 
and to provide instruction concerning their responses.  Additionally, encouragement to 
become fully involved in the study from start to completion was enclosed in the message.  
Specifically, these points were included: 
• Respondents were asked to take a moment and review the question from their 
individual perspectives as soon as possible after receipt.  They were asked to 
send their ideas back to the researcher as a reply to the basic message or as a 
new e-mail. 
• They were instructed to remember there was no required format for answering 
the question.  Their answers could be as long or short as they wished, using 
any format such as talking points, phrases, sentences, or paragraphs.  Getting 
the discovery process started was the primary focus of round one.  “When you 
consider the question, what are your thoughts?” was the basic guidance. 
• They were reminded that they were anonymous, and so were free to express 
their thoughts as they wished.  They were told that for round two they could 
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expect to receive a compilation of the responses returned from round one for 
their consideration. 
• They were reminded that there would be an approximate two-week period 
between the closing of round one and round two, and once again, thanked for 
their participation.   
Conduct of the Study 
 
 
The study was conducted along the traditional lines of the Policy Delphi 
technique, remembering that the goal in this function was not so much to obtain a 
consensus as to expose differing positions and pro and con arguments for these positions 
(Linstone and Turoff, 1975).  The basic method as described by Delbecq, et al (1986) is: 
1. The Principal Investigator develops the initial question and delivers it to the 
panel.  
2. Panelists will generate, and respond with, independent ideas to answer the 
question. 
3. The Principal Investigator will summarize the responses and develop a 
feedback report along with a second set of questions for the panelists. 
4. Upon receiving the feedback report, the panelists will individually evaluate 
earlier responses and independently generate and rate comments to the second 
round.  
5. The Principal Investigator will summarize the second round and ask the 
respondents to rate their findings. 
6. The Respondents will rate their summarized findings. 
7. The Principal Investigator will develop a final summary and report the ratings. 
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Validity and Reliability 
 
 
 Linstone and Turoff (1975) propose that while no one method of inquiry 
completely satisfies every requirement for truth content, the Delphi technique of data 
gathering fosters validity.  Wiersma states that increasing the panel size does not counter 
bias, but only increases the quantity of data.  He goes on to say that it is necessary to 
capture the perceptions of those involved in the study in order to achieve the accurate 
measure of reality that the research seeks (Wiersma, 2000). 
 Turoff states that the objective of the study may not be consensus, but to elicit 
diverse points of view and potential aspects of the issue, given that the respondents are 
broader in scope than the background that any one individual possesses (Linstone and 
Turoff, 1975). 
 According to Linstone and Turoff (1975) the premise of reliability of the Delphi 
study lies in the inference that a larger group, using consistent methods with other 
experts, would develop the same results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
 
 In the one hundred three years man has been flying heavier-than-air machines, the 
complexity of the aircraft and the systems with which they fly has increased 
exponentially.  This increase in technology has dictated a change from single pilot 
operation to multi-pilot operation and from little or no formal training to extensive initial 
training, with formally scheduled recurrent training in those systems and an 
accompanying shift from “seat of the pants” flying to monitoring computer generated 
systems displays as the airplane flies itself on autopilot.  Is this shift creating problems? 
 
Rationale 
 
 
 The purpose of this study was to identify the possibility that current FAA pilot 
testing policy for type rated airplanes might lead to a loss of basic flying skills by the 
pilots, and, if this policy did lead to a loss of skills, to suggest steps that the training 
community might take to prevent this further degradation of skills from continuing to 
happen.   
 The results of the study were separated into two sections and were structured to 
correlate with the two sides of the question:  (A) “Does the policy create a problem” and, 
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(B) “What corrective actions can be taken by the training community to prevent, or at a 
minimum, to minimize the effects.”  This purpose was achieved by the use of the Policy 
Delphi technique. 
The Classic Delphi was developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s.  The 
Policy Delphi evolved and was first introduced in 1969 and reported on in 1970 (Turoff 
& Linstone, 1975).  The original concept of the Delphi as introduced and utilized, was 
designed to seek consensus from a group of experts on a technical topic of interest.  The 
Policy Delphi seeks to generate ideas on the potential resolutions of an issue.  The Policy 
Delphi also rests on the premise that the respondents will present options and supporting 
evidence toward the question and that consensus is not a major objective of the study.  
Turoff (1970) notes that the structure of the process may make consensus unlikely.  
As the study moved through the discovery process, comments from the 
respondents were grouped and categorized and made available via e-mail for the next 
round.  The final ratings from round three came after the study had stabilized following 
round two, and indicated an emergent understanding of the problem. 
 
The Question 
 
 
The Delphi question sent to each respondent was:  “The FAA requires the 
demonstrated use of automation during type and recurrent flight checks.  (A) How does 
this requirement lead to over-reliance on automation? and, (B) What actions can be taken 
by the training community to correct this possible trend?” 
Because of the researcher’s professional experience in the field of study, every  
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effort was taken to avoid biasing the question with the researcher’s ideas or opinions.  
 Round one consisted of the preamble “The FAA requires the demonstrated use of 
automation during type and recurrent flight checks.” Followed by the question “How 
does this requirement lead to an over-reliance on automation, and what actions can be 
taken by the training community to correct this possible trend?”  Round one was sent to 
16 respondents on May 23, 2006, with all 16 returning the questionnaire (Appendix E).    
The responses generated a total of 16 areas of discovery for the first part of the question 
and 13 areas for the second part. 
 
Synopsis of Round One 
 
 
In response to the first part of the question, regarding testing policy developing an 
over-reliance on automation, the respondents identified 15 areas of interest during 
discovery.  Embedded in the areas of discovery were insights into training philosophies, 
ab-initio training, the capabilities of aging pilots, and computer literacy.  The second part 
of the question generated 13 areas of discovery with imbedded issues of regulations that 
needed to be written or changed, recertification of instructors, and industry-wide training 
requirements made mandatory by the FAA.  In most cases, the comments showed a great 
concern for the situation as it currently exists. 
 
Selected Quotes, Round One 
 
 
 “Create scenarios to demonstrate the limitations of automation.” 
 “The use of automation . . . is a skill that should be and must be evaluated.” 
“I reject the notion that over-reliance exists.” 
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 “Automation makes us safer and more efficient pilots.”  
 “Pilots with poor flying skills are most likely to use automation as a crutch and 
are at highest risk for over-reliance.” 
 “Automation is a powerful tool, but only as good as the skill and knowledge of 
the operator.”   
 “Develop flight lessons specifically for automation skills.” 
 “Emphasize the techniques of ‘de-layering’ automation during training.” 
 “Limit automation to those who can demonstrate manual skills.” 
 
Round Two 
 
 The second round e-mail was sent to all 16 participants (Appendix F) on June 19, 
2006.  It provided the respondents with a compiled list of the thoughts of both sides of the 
question unveiled during the first round of discovery as well as the quotes listed above.  
The accompanying letter thanked them for their insights and encouraged additional 
discovery as they reviewed and commented on their efforts of round one.  They were 
challenged to re-think their ideas, challenge the thinking of other respondents as they 
thought necessary, and add new thoughts triggered by other comments or ideas. Several 
new ideas emerged from the first round.  It was pointed out that the PTS defines the 
minimum standards for success and that the panel must remember that in their thoughts 
and comments.  It was also noted that the current testing standards are of another time: 
“Evaluations are currently based on aging theories developed during the ‘jet’ age and are 
rapidly becoming outdated.”  Well said.  Regarding the issue of industry-wide 
standardization, we were reminded that marketing, not flying safety is the driving force 
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behind which manufacturer uses what equipment, and as a consequence, there will never 
be industry-wide standardization without a direct FAA direction. 
 
Synopsis of Round Two 
 
 
Round two had a 100 % return rate.  Added discovery came as amplification to 
previous comments by other respondents.  In each case, it was intended to clarify and 
further define a previous input.  Individual bias was evident in several comments, and 
comments ranged from whimsical to brute force and direct, challenges.  The discussions 
around the infallibility of newer automated equipment and the acceptability of placing 
complete trust in it drew the more pointed comments.  “Wow!  I hear dead pilots telling 
me how good this idea was.”  “How many more crews will we have to lose to show the 
stupidity of this comment?”  There was a noticeable difference of opinion between the 
pilots trained before the level of cockpit sophistication reached today’s level, and those 
who have always had some form of automated assistance in the cockpit. 
 
Selected Quotes, Round Two 
 
 
“I think we have to realize that automation is a two-edged sword and that over-
reliance can definitely be a problem.”   
 “Over-reliance is only a problem if the automation quits and your basic airman 
skills are not proficient.” 
 “As manufacturers’ representatives, we must make sure clients are taught how it 
works.”  
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 “Mastery of the airplane should be first priority.  Second priority should be a 
reasonably useful familiarity with the automation.” 
 “In any case, there’s no such thing as ‘pilot proof’.” 
 “No one properly trained in the proper use of the turn and slip indicator and the 
airspeed indicator will ever be over-reliant on automation.” 
 “Who is in charge, the pilot or the machine?” 
From the received inputs it was obvious that no clear consensus would develop.  
This outcome was not unexpected, and was mentioned as a possibility by Turoff (1970).  
The comments were, however diverse, grouped closely enough to form 15 possible 
reasons a problem existed and 13 possible methods to correct or prevent the problem.  
Two of the ideas for correcting or preventing the problem through training were 
combined into a single entry reducing the solutions to 13.  The two items of discovery 
generating the highest level of interest were dealing with the idea of training doctrine 
being forced by the regulation, and that of placing full confidence in the automation 
equipment.   Individual comment on these two topics of discovery was spirited. 
 
Round Three 
 
 
   As in round two, the e-mail sent to the respondents was a compilation of their 
earlier responses and comments (Appendix G).  They were commended for their thoughts 
and insightful responses to the areas of interest and once again reminded of their 
anonymous relationship to one another.  In this round, however, the areas of interest were 
converted into statements and the respondents were asked to review both halves of the 
question and then rate each item on a Likert-like 0 to 7 scale with 0 having the lowest 
 
 
 40
rating and therefore, having little or no merit to determining the existence of a problem or 
a solution.  A rating of 7 would indicate the statement had significant merit pertaining to 
the existence of a problem or the solution.  The panel was again reminded that additional 
comments or discovery were appropriate.   
 
Synopsis of Round Three 
 
 
 Round three was sent on July 17th, 2006, at the peak of the summer vacation 
schedule, and, as it turned out, the busiest time for all the training centers as well.  All 
three training centers were operating at full capacity and, in addition to regular classroom 
and simulator schedules, the members of the panel actively flying were also spending an 
unusual amount of time out of the office and away from their normal communication 
channels.  Respondents holding cockpit positions with Part 135 and fractional operators 
were equally busy.  Consequently, the turn around time for receiving the final data was, 
by necessity, extended until the second week in August.  All 16 respondents eventually 
completed the round three ratings.  There was no new discovery during round three but 
several respondents did choose to amplify their reasons for scoring some of the items as 
they did.  Using the scale of 0 to 7, with 0 being the lowest score and having no potential 
to determine either the existence of a problem or a possible solution, and 7 having a very 
high potential to determine the existence of a problem or a possible solution, the 
respondents were asked to consider each item in light of both parts of the question “Does 
the FAA requirement to use automation on a checkride lead to over-reliance on 
automation, and, what actions can be taken by the training community to correct this 
possible trend?”   
 
 
 41
 With a maximum mean of 7, ten of the items concerning the possible over-
reliance on automation were considered as having some potential for addressing the 
problem. One item had a neutral mean of four; and three items with means less than 
neutral were assessed as having no potential for addressing the problem.  Following are 
the ten items the panel found to have some potential to address the problem:  
  First Item:  The proper use of automation to fly modern aircraft is a skill just like 
hand flying.  It needs to be, and should continue to be, evaluated (M= 6.31). 
 Second Item:  The complexities of installed automation may require additional 
training to use and master the equipment (M=6.06). 
 Third Item:  Training doctrine puts a high priority on automation (M= 5.25). 
 Fourth Item:  Over-reliance is generally dependent on pilot experience.  It appears 
to be inversely proportional to experience (M= 5.25). 
 Fifth Item:  Pilots with poor flying skills are most likely to use automation as a 
crutch and are at highest risk for over-reliance (M= 5.12). 
 Sixth Item:  The lack of industry-wide standardization is a causal factor to the 
problem (M= 4.93). 
 Seventh Item:  Over-reliance on automation may lead to a feeling of 
invulnerability and infallibility (M= 4.75). 
 Eighth Item:  Over-reliance results in a loss of situational awareness (SA) 
 (M= 4.56). 
 Ninth Item:  There is insufficient syllabus time to properly train crews in the 
proper use of automation (M= 4.50). 
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 Tenth Item:  What is perceived as over-reliance may be a lack of skill in utilizing 
automation (M= 4.18). 
 With a maximum mean of 7, eleven possible solutions were identified as having 
potential to address the problem.  Two items fell below the neutral mean and were 
assessed as having no potential to address the problem.  For clarity, responses to the 
second half of the question will be referred to as ‘solutions’. 
 Solution One:  Training should include specific techniques to handle automation 
(M= 6.50). 
 Solution Two:  The instructor and examiner must ensure that the automation is 
used as a tool, not a crutch (M= 6.06). 
 Solution Three:  The evaluator must create a balanced level during the checkride 
to ensure manual skills are demonstrated to balance the use of automation (M= 5.81). 
 Solution Four:  Recurrent and subsequent training should include incrementally 
more difficult and complex scenarios, teaching more efficient and appropriate uses of 
automation (M= 5.75). 
 Solution Five:  Definable minimum levels of training must be established  
(M= 5.68). 
 Solution Six:  Increase training time without sacrificing systems integration  
(M= 5.62). 
 Solution Seven:  Intensify training in failure mode management.  Automation 
should be used as a supplement to the primary tools in the aircraft, never as a substitute 
(M= 5.56). 
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 Solution Eight:  Trainers must be trained to teach the specific automation installed 
in the aircraft to include the conceptual fundamentals of how the system software 
determines courses of action in specific situations (M=5.18). 
 Solution Nine:  There must be satisfactory demonstration of manual skills before 
allowing the use of automation (M= 5.00). 
 Solution Ten:  Courseware development must be upgraded to allow for 
maximized training (M= 4.93). 
 Solution Eleven:  The training community must develop internet-based interactive 
training modules to prepare the student prior to his arrival at the training site (M= 4.25). 
Table II lists the ideas and solutions, shows the actual scores posted by the 
respondents in the order they were received, and the mean for each idea and solution.   
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TABLE II 
ROUND THREE RANKING OF DOMINANT IDEAS BY THE DELPHI PANEL 
 
Idea    Ideas and Solutions  n=16     Total  Mean 
 
1. Over-reliance is not a problem at this time        39  2.4375 
2. Perceived over-reliance may be lack of knowledge         67  4.1875 
3. Training doctrine puts a high priority on automation       84  5.2500 
4. Total reliance acceptable based on system design       30  1.8750 
5. Proper use of automation a skill to be evaluated     101  6.3125 
6. Pilots with poor flying skills highest risk for over-reliance      82  5.1250 
7. Complexities of equipment require additional training      97  6.0625 
8. Over-reliance dependent on pilot experience         84  5.2500 
9. No pilot trained on needle, ball and airspeed has a problem      40  2.5000 
10. Lack of industry-wide standardization a causal factor       79  4.9375 
11. Insufficient syllabus time to properly train crews        72  4.5000 
12. Over-reliance causes loss of Situational Awareness        73  4.5625 
13. Over-reliance leads to feeling invulnerable and invincible       76   4.7500 
14. The PTS forces over-reliance on automation to be taught       64  4.0000 
 
 
Solution 
 
1. Increase training time without sacrificing systems integration    90  5.6250 
2. Training should include specific techniques for automaton       104  6.5000 
3. Definable minimum levels of training must be established          91  5.6875 
4. Evaluator must establish balance to ensure proper use            93  5.8125 
5. Demonstrate manual skills before allowing automation       80  5.0000 
6. Require use of manual skills after automation mastered         81  3.8125 
7. Instructor and evaluator must ensure used as tool, not crutch     97  6.0625 
8. Automation training separated from aircraft specific training     23  1.4375 
9. Recurrent training should introduce complex automation skills  92  5.7500 
10. Trainers need specific and detailed training on equipment       83  5.1875 
11 Teach failure mode management          89  5.5625 
12. Upgrade courseware development to maximize training        79  4.9375 
13. Training Community develop interactive training modules        68  4.2500 
  
 
 
Table III displays the mean scores for each idea and solution in rank order as 
reported by the respondents.  Calculating the means without the outliers made no 
significant difference in rankings. 
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TABLE III 
 
 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS’ RATING OF FINDINGS 
 
Idea     n=16                 Mean      Rank Order 
 
  5.   Proper of automation use a skill to be evaluated   6.3125   1 
  7.   Complexities of equipment require additional training              6.0625   2 
  3.   Training doctrine puts a high priority on automation                5.2500    3 
  8.   Over-reliance dependant on pilot experience               5.2500   4 
  6.   Pilots with poor flying skills highest risk for over-reliance        5.1250    5 
10.   Lack of industry-wide standardization a causal factor               4.9375   6 
13.  Over-reliance leads to feeling invulnerable and invincible   4.7500     7 
12.  Over-reliance causes loss of Situational Awareness               4.5625   8 
11.  Insufficient syllabus time to properly train crews    4.5000   9 
  2.  Perceived over-reliance may be lack of knowledge                4.1875 10 
11.  Insufficient syllabus time to properly train crews    4.5000 11 
12. Over-reliance causes loss of Situational Awareness    4.5625 12 
  1. Over-reliance is not a problem at this time    2.4375 13 
  4. Total reliance acceptable based on system design   1.8750 14 
  
Solution 
 
  2.  Training should include specific techniques for automaton    6.5000   1 
  7.  Instructor and evaluator must ensure used as tool, not crutch   6.0625   2 
  4.  Evaluator must establish balance to ensure proper use    5.8125    3 
  9.  Recurrent training should introduce complex automation skills  5.7500   4 
  3.  Definable minimum levels of training must be established   5.6875   5 
  1.  Increase training time without sacrificing systems integration   5.6250   6 
11.  Teach failure mode management      5.5625   7 
10.  Trainers need specific and detailed training on equipment  5.1875   8 
  5.  Demonstrate manual skills before allowing automation     5.0000   9 
12.  Upgrade courseware development to maximize training        4.9375 10 
13.  Training Community develop interactive training modules   4.2500 11 
  6.  Require use of manual skills after automation mastered   3.8125 12 
  8.  Automation training separated from aircraft specific training  1.4375  13 
 
 
 Throughout the three rounds of the Delphi, the respondents were quite clear and 
forthright in voicing their input to the questions asked.   No one ever cited ‘chapter and 
verse’ of any part of 14 CFR Part 61, the federal regulation governing flight training, or 
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Part 91, the regulation governing general flight rules and operations, but it was evident 
from the comments that those regulations as well as those pertaining to formal training 
were never far from their minds.  This was especially evident in the second part of the 
question dealing with prevention. 
 The rank ordered listing of the respondents returns are presumed to be their final 
quantitative positions on the question.  Statistician Richard Shavelson (1996) notes that 
the mean is the most basic and frequently used measure of central tendency (p 92).  As 
only one ranking was accomplished, there was no requirement to weight the means 
obtained.  
 Using the scale of 0 to 7, only those items scoring above the median score of 4 
were considered to be relevant to the question.   This resulted in 12 items on the first half 
of the question that the respondents saw as having the greatest impact for addressing the 
question of a problem existing.  The highest level of concern was over the need to 
properly evaluate the use of automation.  The complexity of training along with the 
priority placed on automation by training doctrine closely followed.  Finally, pilot 
experience and skill was addressed.  They found 11 items of interest in the second half of 
the question concerning possible solutions.  All items in the second half of the question 
had an impact on training.  The highest ranking of comments was on equipment specific 
training and instructor requirements to ensure proper utilization of the equipment.  
Examination requirements and future courseware development were also interest items. 
 Chapter V will draw conclusions and make recommendations based on this study.
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CHAPTER V 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
  
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the possibility that the current FAA 
testing policy of directing the use of all available automation during initial type 
certification flight checks leads to over-reliance on automation, and to ask what actions 
could be taken by the training community to correct this possible trend.  The study was 
divided into two sections.  The first section addressed the Delphi panel’s discoveries 
concerning the possibility that the current flight testing policy does, in fact, lead to an 
over-reliance on automation with a concurrent loss of basic flying skills.  The second 
section addressed possible actions the training community might take to correct this 
degradation of skills if it were determined the problem of over-reliance on automation did 
exist. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
 
 This study sought to answer the following research question:  “The FAA requires 
the demonstrated use of automation during flight and recurrent flight checks.  (A) How 
does this requirement lead to over-reliance on automation, and (B) What actions can be 
taken by the training community to correct this possible trend?”
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Findings of the Review of Literature 
 
 
 The review of literature described the development of the airplane and the 
concurrent growth of technology beginning with the Wrights’ first Flyer and progressing 
to the present.  The growth of technology and its incorporation into the modern cockpit 
was traced.  In a parallel manner, the requirements to be certified as a pilot were followed 
with the emphasis being put on the requirements to obtain an Airline Transport Pilot 
rating, after the establishment of the rating in 1926.    
 The review of literature showed that, as the airplane matured, the complexities 
and benefits of cockpit automation were integrated, and how, as technological 
capabilities increased, machines assumed responsibility for the management of engine 
performance monitoring as well as navigational duties.   
 
Findings of the Delphi Committee 
 
 
 To achieve the purpose of the study, aviation training experts were asked to 
determine if the current FAA policy of mandating the use of all automation during 
recurrent and type checks might lead to an over-reliance on automation, and, if it were 
determined to be the case, what actions could be taken by the training community to 
correct this possible trend.  The study took the form of a three-round Policy Delphi to 
seek clarification of the issue (Dalkey, et al. 1963).  The first two rounds were for 
discovery, and the final round called for a Likert-type rating scale to determine the 
position of each expert respondent regarding the potential of each of the dominant items 
generated by the two rounds of discovery to address the question.   
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 Twenty experts were invited – and agreed – to participate.  Only 16 respondents, 
however, returned the initial questionnaire and, thus, became the expert panel for the 
study.   
 
Round One Findings 
 
 
 In the first round of discovery, the respondents identified 15 dominant items of 
interest pertaining to the first half of the question regarding the testing policy, and 13 
items regarding the second half of the question for training concerns.  Sixteen 
respondents participated in round one. 
 
Round Two Findings 
 
 
 During round two of the study, the 16 respondents were asked to review their first 
round comments, and to amplify or clarify any input made by themselves or any other 
member of the panel.  They were also asked to note the strengths and weaknesses of the 
items as they were presented to them in this round.  Several respondents modified their 
original comments and several added clarifying comments to their original positions.  
The conclusion of round two resulted in two of the original 15 policy items being 
consolidated into one, leaving 14 to be considered.  The 13 training items were refined by 
amplification, but there were no additions or deletions to the list.   
 
Round Three Findings 
 
 In round three of the study, all the respondents were asked to rate each of the 
items on a Likert-like scale. Rating was necessary in order to gain the perspective of each 
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expert regarding the merits of each of the panel-generated dominant items, to answer both 
sides of the question.   
   
Conclusions 
 
 
 The conclusions are divided into two sections.  The first section concerns the 
problem of over-reliance on automation.  The second section concerns possible actions 
by the training community to correct the problems of over-reliance. 
 The panel responded to the first part of the question by affirming their belief that 
over-reliance on automation does, in fact, exist.  This belief was evident in the manner 
the panel worded their discoveries: “The proper use of automation . . . is a skill . . .  and 
should continue to be evaluated,” and, “Training doctrine puts a high priority on 
automation.”  Two of the top three ideas acknowledge the problem is present; one by 
recognizing the need for evaluation, the other by confirming that training doctrine has 
migrated from aircraft control to systems management.  There was general agreement 
concerning levels of experience with dependency on the use of automation, but not 
necessarily with age being directly proportional to experience.  Respondents likewise 
agreed that training philosophy should incorporate automation, but not to the exclusion of 
“hands on” flying capabilities.  In regard to the wording of the Special Emphasis Section 
of the Practical Test Standard (PTS) concerning the required use of automation, there was 
no consensus on whether or not it was a factor, although it was acknowledged that it 
might possibly encourage over-reliance.  Company training policies and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) requiring the use of the autopilot at all times other than take 
off and landing also were cited as major factors. 
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 The panel responded to the second half of the question with near unanimity in 
changes to the training program.   Only once was it suggested that the PTS should be 
changed.  That lone suggestion was lost in the second round and never resurfaced.  The 
other solutions were well reasoned and supported in both rounds.  In round one, most 
solutions were presented in complete sentence form and clearly understood.  Round two 
clarification was generally an expansion of the first sentence, and in most cases, not by 
the original respondent.  Comments on strengths and weaknesses of the solutions were 
likewise well thought out.  The most prevalent solution called for training to include 
specific techniques to handle automation.  Some initially considered that to mean brand 
name specific training, but that suggestion was clarified during round two.  Brand name 
specific instruction was listed as solution eight.  Solutions two and three called for the 
instructor and examiner to be certain the automation was being properly utilized and not 
being used as a crutch.  It was agreed that from an instructor’s viewpoint, there is never 
enough time in the syllabus.  That being the case, it was also agreed that more time isn’t 
always the answer.  They felt more effective use of the available time would always yield 
enhanced results. The panel noted that the earliest training philosophies utilized a 
systematic approach correlating visual conditions to instrument indications.  They noted 
that integration of advanced automation should begin at the outset of training and 
continue throughout in the same manner. Further, they felt that this building block 
approach has proven too effective to abandon. 
Recommendations 
 
 
 Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are offered as 
related to the findings.  The panel agreed that there was an over-reliance on automation, 
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quite possibly encouraged by the FAA requirement mandating its use during type and 
recurrent checks.  Internal company policy was also cited as a causal factor. 
 With the panel’s findings in mind, the recommendations of this study must 
include: 
1. Adding additional syllabus time to both initial and recurrent classroom instruction 
to increase the students’ understanding of the automation features of their aircraft.  
This can be accomplished by adding hours to the syllabus, or by re-aligning times 
allocated to other systems. 
2. Initial type rating simulator lessons should include instruction on the proper use of 
aircraft automation as an adjunct means of aircraft control.   
3. Recurrent simulator lessons should require a mix of automation failures as well as 
en route programming tasks to evaluate and train the more experienced crews on 
system capabilities. 
4. Type rating examinations must include automation failures to properly evaluate 
the applicant’s ability to recognize the failure and safely fly the aircraft in a 
manual mode of operation. 
5. The FAA should mandate a level of commonality in respect to systems operations 
much the same way they instituted the commonality of the ‘basic six’ instrument 
panel arrangement.   
6. Training providers should examine their courseware to maximize training 
opportunities. 
       7.  Flight departments must allow flight crews to hand fly the aircraft without 
 automation when feasible, such as on repositioning legs. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 Changing the standards for issuing an initial type rating or for satisfying the 
requirements for recurrent training is a difficult task.  If the change is directed downward 
from the FAA, the industry will, by necessity, comply - perhaps not without resistance, 
but compliance will eventually be required.  The procedures are defined in the Code of 
Federal Regulations and are very structured and measured in their protocols.  This 
procedure has resulted in a relatively stable set of regulations with changes being 
reviewed at several levels before implementation.  Usually, the aviation community has 
the opportunity to comment on a new regulation and prepare for its implementation.  
 Five of the seven recommendations call for changes to be made by the training 
community.  Without industry-wide recognition that change is required, there is 
considerable risk involved for a training provider to implement changes on an individual 
basis.  Some changes, such as restructuring classroom hours, can be made without too 
much impact on the training provider.  Other changes, such as adding training material 
and hours to an established course, will be much more difficult to implement.  First, the 
internal cost of developing and producing the courseware must be considered.  Secondly, 
the revisions must be approved by the training facility’s FAA Primary Operations 
Inspector before they can be put into the syllabus.  Finally, the production expense will 
have to be factored into the quoted cost to the consumer for the particular course of 
instruction.  The aircrew training business is a very costly business.  Decisions to change 
existing training contracts are often made by the accounting division, not the aviation 
department or the chief pilot.  The cost of an initial type rating in a business class jet 
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already exceeds several thousands of dollars, depending on the airplane. If a training 
provider adds two days to the length of a course, along with a cost increase, the provider 
will have to convince the client base that the increase in time and expense is good value 
for money, or run the risk of losing clients strictly on the economic issue.   
 This researcher recommends that the major training providers meet under the 
auspices of an aviation-oriented organization such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association or the National Business Aircraft Association to develop an agreed plan to 
organize the use of automation.  The problem of over-reliance on automation is no longer 
limited to the business aircraft segment of the industry:  glass cockpit technology is now 
available and being offered to the single-engine community by the major aircraft 
manufacturers, and is rapidly becoming the preferred choice for new airplane deliveries.  
 As this technology becomes more readily affordable, the problems inherent with 
the technology will continue to increase until fully addressed by regulation.
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DELPHI STUDY:  PARTICIPATION SOLICITATION SCRIPT (VERBAL) 
 
(Greeting)  I am a doctoral candidate through Oklahoma State University, the College of 
Education in Aviation and Space Education. 
 
Because of your expertise in aviation training, I am requesting your voluntary 
participation as a Delphi panel respondent in my research study.  Your participation will 
be completely anonymous — i.e., your name and identifying characteristics will never be 
used — and there is no benefit to you, other than the satisfaction of speaking freely from 
your area of expertise in an interesting, and important, study.  Your participation will be 
enormously appreciated, and entirely voluntary, with no consequences for withdrawal 
before the study is completed. 
 
My research study will be conducted as a classic Delphi study.  
• In the first round, I will send a single question to respondents, and ask them to 
respond, through e-mail, with their interpretations of the essential components in the 
question.  Responses will be separated from the senders’ identities upon receipt. 
• For the second round, I will correlate, rank, and condense the first-round responses of 
all participants into common themes and new issues to be considered.  Second-round 
responses will, again, be separated from respondents’ identities, and correlated, 
ranked and condensed. 
• Third-round responses (if required) will seek clarification, from each respondent, of 
the identified issues and will ask respondents to rate the correlated responses.   
 
Consensus is not a goal of the Delphi technique process. 
 
Again, every precaution to maintain confidentiality and privacy will be taken.  The 
Delphi format encourages complete freedom to discuss the issues, because of the 
anonymity of panel respondents to each other. 
 
Your time involvement will be whatever you choose to put into any round in which you 
participate.  Prompt responses are encouraged, because there will be only 10 days 
between rounds, once the question is released to the respondents.  The question will be 
sent to all respondents on the same day. 
 
If you verbally agree to participate, I will e-mail you an implied, informed consent form, 
before sending you the research question.  An e-mail reply to the form will constitute 
your consent to participate. 
 
May I count on you to be one of the respondents?   
 
Thank you!  
 
Chuck Sullivan 
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CONSENT FORM for Delphi Study 
Dear Delphi panel respondent: To consent to participate, please read this document, then 
click on reply. Your reply will give me your implied, informed consent. Thank you. Charles 
(Chuck) Sullivan 
AUTHORIZATION 
I, (respondent) , hereby authorize Charles Sullivan to include my input in his research study. 
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH AND ASSOCIATED RISKS/BENEFITS. 
• Name of research project: RECURRENT FLIGHT TRAINING TRENDS: A DELPHI 
STUDY TO EXAMINE A POSSIBLE LOSS OF PILOTING SKILLS 
•  
• Statement of affiliation: The study involves participating in research conducted by 
Principal Investigator (PI) Charles Sullivan, a doctoral candidate through Oklahoma 
State University, Stillwater, OK.  Explanation of the purposes of the research and 
expected duration: The purpose of the research is to ask aviation training experts to 
explore the possibility that FAA training requirements may have a detrimental effect on 
basic flying skills. The problem is that due to the special emphasis on "use of available 
automation," the pilot may try to program his way out of a problem rather than revert to 
basic flying skills to correct the situation. Respondents’ participation is expected to occur 
on three occasions spanning less than 45 days, total. 
• Description of the procedures to be utilized: The research will be conducted as a 
three-round Delphi technique in which respondents will be asked to respond to a single 
question in the first round, then to comment on issues brought out by all respondents in 
the first round. 
• Description of any benefits to the respondents… None, to the respondent, other than 
the satisfaction of speaking freely on the subject. By defining the issues, there will be 
some benefits to the industry and to society. 
• Statement describing the extent …to which confidentiality will be maintained: 
Respondents’ identifying information will be separated from their responses upon receipt 
(except for consent form). Respondents’ names and other identifying information will not 
be used. PI is only person having access to the email account being used. 
• Explanation of how and whom to contact about: 
The research: PI, Charles Sullivan; 817- 492 - 8060; charles.r.sullivan@att.net  
Research respondents’ rights: the IRB office at 405 - 744 - 5700 
Additional contact: Dr. Carol Olson, IRB Chair, Oklahoma State University, 415 Whitehurst, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078; or Dr. Steven Marks, 308 Cordell North, Stillwater, OK, 74087 or 
steve.marks@aesp.nasa.okstste.edu. 
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VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
I understand that participation is voluntary and that I will not be penalized if I choose not to 
participate. I also understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and end my participation in 
this project at any time without penalty after I notify the project director, Charles Sullivan at 
 817-492-8060 or charles.r.sullivan@att.net 
  
CONSENT DOCUMENTATION  
I have read and fully understand this consent form. I consent freely and voluntarily. My reply to 
this document constitutes my consent. 
  
(Consent by clicking "REPLY") 
  
PI’S STATEMENT 
I certify that this document explains all required elements of the research study to the respondent, 
and that I am available to answer any additional questions that may arise through email 
(charles.r.sullivan@att.net) or by phone (817-492-8060). Asking the respondent to click on 
"REPLY" is equivalent to asking the respondent to sign the form. 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
NOTIFICATION TO EXPECT THE DELPHI QUESTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69
22 May 2006 
  
Dear Delphi Respondent, 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.  I believe the study addresses an important 
issue in the training community. 
  
On Tuesday, 23 May, I will start the Delphi process by sending the question to each of you to 
discover your thoughts and comments, in the first of three rounds. 
  
Please take a moment as soon as possible to look at the question and put down your thoughts 
about the issues involved in the question from your standpoint as an IP and/or evaluator.  You 
can return your responses either as a reply to the question itself or as a new email to 
charles.r.sullivan@att.net. 
  
The question will have instructions.  The important thing for round one is to get started. 
 What do you think when you consider the question? 
  
Remember that you will never be identified -- so you may say anything you wish! 
  
For Round Two (early June), you will receive a compilation of all the respondents' comments from 
Round One, for your further consideration. 
  
After I send the question, you won't hear from me for about two weeks.  Time is critical!  Each 
round should be returned within ten days. 
  
Thank you, again, for your participation. 
  
Chuck Sullivan (PI) 
817-492-8060 
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23 May 2006 
Round 1 
The FAA requires the demonstrated use of automation during type and recurrent 
flight checks. (A) How does this requirement lead to over-reliance on automation, 
and, (B) What actions can be taken by the training community to correct this 
possible trend? 
Please engage in individual brainstorming so as to generate as many ideas as possible for 
dealing with this issue. Please list each idea in a brief, concise manner and e-mail your 
response to me. Your ideas need not be fully developed. It is preferable to have each idea 
expressed in one brief sentence or phrase. No attempt should be made to evaluate or 
justify these ideas at this time. Treat each half of the question as a standalone part. Your 
ideas will be anonymously included in the next questionnaire. 
Idea # 1A: 
  
Idea # 2A: 
  
Idea # 3A: 
  
Idea # 4A: 
  
Idea # 5A: 
  
Idea # 6A: 
  
Idea # 7A: 
  
Idea # 8A: 
 
Idea # 9A: 
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Idea # 10A: 
  
Idea # 1B: 
  
Idea # 2B: 
  
Idea # 3B: 
  
Idea # 4B: 
  
Idea # 5B: 
  
Idea # 6B: 
  
Idea # 7B: 
  
Idea # 8B: 
  
Idea # 9B: 
  
Idea # 10B: 
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19 June 2006 
 
Round Two 
 
Thank you all for your responses to Round 1 (of 3).  Your answers were thoughtful and 
insightful from the perspective of your areas of expertise and years of experience, and fell 
between a terse statement that there are no problems with either the Special Emphasis 
section of the PTS or the way ATP initial and recurrent checks are administered, to dire 
warnings that we are doomed to creating a generation of accidents just waiting to occur if 
we don’t make some significant changes to the system in short order.  There were levels 
of both humor and bitterness in some of the responses, and that is good, for it signifies 
that you are taking the question seriously, whichever side you happen to be on.  
 
Sixteen of 20 potential respondents replied positively to my initial request for assistance.  
Each of you were carefully chosen based on your unique experiences and qualifications 
in the aviation community as well as being qualified instructor pilots, and in some cases, 
examiners.  The diversity in your backgrounds will bring an insightful view of the 
question.  
 
In this round, you will be asked to comment on the discoveries of Round 1.  Please 
feel free to consider, reconsider, rebut, challenge the other opinions represented, 
and/or modify or update your own ideas/opinions as you see fit.  Remember that you 
are transparent to one another and your identities will never be divulged, so you are free 
to voice your opinions.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is a busy season for us all.  The effective date of transmission for Round 2 is 
Tuesday, 20 June.  In order to process the data and have round 3 available for you the 
week of 9 July, it is imperative that I have your responses not later than Friday, 30 
June.   
You may make your comments as long or short as you like.  Please use “reply” and 
make your comments adjacent to the area you wish to reply to.  Additional 
comments may be added if you wish: New discovery is appropriate and will be 
cheerfully accepted. 
 
The question is unchanged: 
The FAA requires the demonstrated use of automation during type and recurrent 
flight checks.  (A) How does this requirement lead to over-reliance on automation, 
and, (B) What actions can be taken by the training community to correct this 
possible trend? 
  
Synopsis of Round 1 
As PI, I have collected the many responses and grouped them into general 
categories of discovery.  Each category has a representative sampling of the comments 
received.  There are direct as well as indirect quotes included throughout for flavor and 
color.  Some colors had to be modified a little.  Keep in mind that the question is not 
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limited to your immediate workplace, but is directed toward the universal pilot 
certification question. Discovery to date is applicable to both levels. 
 
 
 
Please refine the ideas below by clarifying them if desired and by listing the 
strengths and weaknesses you associate with each.  Please list any new ideas at the 
bottom of the questionnaire.  Your ideas will be anonymously included in the next 
questionnaire. 
 
The FAA requires the demonstrated use of automation during type and recurrent 
flight checks.  
 
Part A 
 
How does this requirement lead to over-reliance on automation? 
  
Idea 1.  Over-reliance on automation does not seem to be a problem at this time.   
  -Over-reliance does not appear to be a problem, SOPs are. 
  -“Why would over-reliance be a problem?” 
   -“I reject the notion that over-reliance exists.”  
   
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 2.  Lack of skills in using available automation may be the problem. 
 - The lack of skills in using available automation results in being unable to 
 manage the system. 
 -“Pilots lacking an understanding of the automation technology tend to use 
 it improperly and poorly.” 
 -A pilot’s computer skills may impact his ability to pass a flight check, for 
 example, “older pilots may find automation such as a glass cockpit more 
 of a deterrent than a benefit.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
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Idea 3.  Training doctrine puts a high priority on automation. 
- Should mastering the automation be the greatest concern? 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 4.  Total reliance on automation is all right because the equipment is “Pilot Proof.” 
  -“Flight training is easier with the autopilot than hand flying.” 
 “I believe it is engineered to be pilot proof and won’t accept obviously 
 wrong stuff.”  
-  Given the safeguards and redundancy, it’s all right to be reliant on the 
 automation. 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 5.  Problems with total reliance. 
- A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.  When “the box” breaks, the crew is 
lost.  Crews must be taught how to get back to basics when the fancy stuff 
fails. 
- “There is a vast majority of pro pilots out there that do not break out the 
enroute charts when outside the terminal areas.  If things did go black, there 
would be a substantial spool time required to regain SA and revert to basics 
(green data).” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 6.  Necessity to evaluate skill in automation use. 
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- “The proper use of automation to fly modern aircraft is a skill just like hand 
flying.  It needs to and should continue to be evaluated.”   
- Based on the current reliability and multiple levels of automation, we should 
be to demonstrate proper use. 
-    How do we define, and then measure over-reliance? 
- Who is in the best position to make that determination? 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 7.  Problems with poor skills: 
 Pilots with poor flying skills are most likely to use automation as a crutch 
 and are at highest risk for over-reliance. 
 “Reliance on a Flight Director for manual flying shrinks the instrument 
 scan to the FD and the airspeed indicator.”  This can lead to uncoordinated 
 flight under abnormal flight situations. 
 “Over-reliance implies a balance between automation and manual skills 
 has not been maintained.”  Due to company policy on autopilot use. 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 8.  Need for additional training 
 The complexities of installed automation may require additional training 
 to use and master the equipment. 
 Not understanding the capabilities of the system can result in information 
 overload. 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 9.  Automation is on the aircraft; therefore I MUST use it. 
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  “Automation is like getting a new toy.  The tendency is to play with the  
  new toy to the exclusion of the old one.  This can lead to less use of  
  manual control and a loss of basic proficiency.” 
  The flight department directs use above 400 ft 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 10.  Over-Reliance is based on pilot experience. 
 “The older pilot has a broad background of experience to fall back upon.  
 A younger pilot lacks this experience, therefore would be more apt to rely 
 on automation.  The tendency to become over-reliant appears then to be 
 inversely proportional to experience and would also appear to inversely 
 generational as well.”  
 What may seem to be over-reliance for one pilot skill (experience) level 
 may not necessarily be over-reliance for another.  
 “Over-reliance should not occur for an experienced, competent and well-
 trained pilot.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 11.  The lack of industry-wide standardization contributes to the problem. 
 “The absence of intuitive interfaces and standardization across all 
 manufacturers creates a cumbersome and time consuming training 
 requirement.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
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Idea 12.  Insufficient syllabus time to properly train crews. 
 “As trainers, we don’t have the (syllabus) time to emphasize and practice 
 reverting back to a primitive level of aircraft control.” 
-  “The time allocated for training is set at the lowest level in order to 
 maximize throughput.” 
-  “Time required training a pilot to understand and properly use automation 
 implies that precise utilization of automation supersedes efficient 
 operation of the aircraft.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 13.  Over-reliance results in loss of Situational Awareness (SA). 
  Pilots become so reliant on automation they lose Situational Awareness  
  (SA). 
  Over-reliance doesn’t just happen on its own. 
 “A pilot allows himself to become over-reliant over time and lose SA” 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 14.  The use of automation may lead to a feeling of invulnerability and infallibility. 
-  “Automation is a powerful tool, but only as good as the skill and 
 knowledge of the operator.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Idea 15.  The Special Emphasis direction in the PTS forces over-reliance to be taught. 
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 “The Special Emphasis section of the PTS may lead instructors to focus 
 more on automation and less on systems knowledge.  We sometimes teach 
 that automation cures the problem.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
 
The FAA requires the demonstrated use of automation during type and recurrent flight 
checks.  How does this requirement lead to over-reliance on automation, and, 
 
Part B 
 
What actions can be taken by the training community to correct this possible trend? 
 
Solution 1.  Increase training time without sacrificing systems integration. 
  “GA (and airline) training courses are dangerously too short to give  
  comprehensive training on the use of all systems and equipment installed  
  on the aircraft for a majority of pilots.  Courses need to be longer and not  
  so compressed in order to allow this type of training.” 
 Increase training time to cover both automation and redundancy to the 
 next level of flight management. 
  Develop flight lessons specifically for automation skills. 
  Set training requirements for “hands on” skill demonstration. 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 2.  Change training to teach specific techniques to handle automation. 
  “Emphasize techniques of “de-layering” automation during training.” 
 Crew must be taught to regress to less automation when there is an 
 apparent discrepancy. 
  “Require pilots to define the differences between levels of automation.” 
 Pilots must recognize abnormalities and apply necessary and appropriate 
 resources. 
 Create scenarios to demonstrate limitations of automation. 
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♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 3.  Establish a definable minimum level of training. 
 There is an “obligation to determine a ‘norm’ for adequate training time 
 and evaluation.  “Past practices are suspect.” 
 “Identify the minimum skill level and train to that rudimentary level.  
 (Especially pilots new to the aircraft or systems.)” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 4.  Instructor/evaluator must create balanced levels. 
During checkrides make sure manual skills are demonstrated to balance 
the use of automation. 
 “The use of automation may require a new approach to training to include 
 establishing new skillsets as well as new flow patterns.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 5.  Require demonstration of manual skills before allowing automation. 
  Require the pilot to perform high difficulty tasking without automation  
  during  recurrent training. 
 Require raw data approaches to proficiency before allowing FD coupled 
 operations. 
 Limit automation to those who can demonstrate manual skills. 
 Train pilots on instrument flight without the FD. 
 “Measure manual proficiency before introducing automation.” 
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♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 6.  Require use of manual operations after automation mastered. 
 Emphasize proficiency in non-automated environment. 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 7.  Ensure proper usage of automation. 
 “Ensure automation is used as a tool, not a crutch.” 
 “Clearly define the use of flight guidance modes.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 8.  “Training in cockpit automation should be separated from aircraft specific 
training and introduced at some later point in training.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 9.  Recurrent and subsequent training should include incrementally more 
difficult and complex scenarios teaching more effective and appropriate uses of 
automation. 
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♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 10.  “Trainers must be trained to teach specific automation installed in the 
aircraft to include conceptual fundamentals of the level of automation to be utilized in 
specific situations and features that may be inappropriate.” 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 11.  Intensify training on failure mode management. 
- The automation should be used as a supplement to the primary tools in the 
aircraft, never as a substitute or sole source (unless trans-oceanic). 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
Solution 12.  Courseware development must be upgraded to allow for maximized 
training. 
- Classrooms need interactive computer generated presentations. 
- Laptop training courseware needs to be developed end implemented. 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
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Solution 13.  The training community must develop internet-based interactive training 
modules to prepare the pilot prior to his arrival at the training site. 
 
♦ Your clarification (if any) 
♦ Strengths 
♦ Weaknesses 
 
 
 
As one of your colleagues said, “My head hurts from all this thinking.  I am going to start 
the spell checker, push the send button, engage the autopilot, and go get some coffee.” 
 
Thank you for your time and efforts! 
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19 June 2006 
 
DELPHI ROUND 3 
 
 
The purpose of this round is to rate the ideas and solutions developed during the first two 
rounds of the Delphi study dealing with the issue: 
 
The FAA requires the demonstrated use of automation during type and recurrent 
flight checks.  (A) How does this requirement lead to over-reliance on 
automation?  and, (B) What actions can be taken by the training community to 
correct this possible trend? 
 
The following are a summation of the ideas and solutions developed by the participants 
during Rounds 1 and 2.  In this round you are asked to rate each idea and solution.  With 
your rating, I will be able to determine which of the ideas and solutions you consider to 
have the greatest merit for dealing with the question.   
 
Please review the entire list of ideas and solutions.  Then use the ‘reply’ function and rate 
each idea and solution on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 being the lowest rating and 7 the 
highest.  0, being the lowest rating, will indicate the statement has little or no merit to 
either determining the existence of a problem or a solution.  7, as the highest rating, 
will indicate the statement has significant merit pertaining to the existence of a 
problem or the solution.  If you have additional comments, feel free to add them next to 
the appropriate idea or solution.   
 
Thank you for your efforts, your time and patience.  You have been forthright and 
thoughtful in your participation.  I gratefully appreciate the time and effort you have 
devoted to this project. 
 
 
IDEAS (Part A) 
 
 
___1.  Over-reliance on automation does not seem to be a problem at this time. 
 
 
___2.  What is perceived as over-reliance may be a lack of skill in utilizing available 
 automation. 
 
 
____3.  Training doctrine puts a high priority on automation. 
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____4.  Total reliance on automation is acceptable based on system design and 
 redundancy. 
 
____5.  The proper use of automation to fly modern aircraft is a skill just like hand 
 flying.  It needs to and should continue to be evaluated. 
 
 
____6.  Pilots with poor flying skills are most likely to use automation as a crutch and are 
 at highest risk for over-reliance. 
 
 
____7.  The complexities of installed automation may require additional training to use 
 and master the equipment.    
 
 
____8.  Over-reliance is generally dependent on pilot experience.  It appears to be 
 inversely proportional to experience. 
 
 
____9.  No pilot trained on “ …needle, ball and airspeed …” will become over-reliant. 
 
 
____10.  The lack of industry-wide standardization is a causal factor to the problem. 
 
 
____11.  There is insufficient syllabus time to properly train crews in the proper use of 
automation. 
 
 
____12.  Over-reliance on automation results in a loss of situational awareness (SA). 
 
 
____13.  Over-reliance on automation may lead to a feeling of invulnerability and 
 infallibility.   
 
 
____14.  The Special Emphasis section in the Practical Test Standards (PTS) forces over-
reliance to be taught.   
 
 
SOLUTIONS  (Part B) 
 
 
____1.  Increase training time without sacrificing systems integration. 
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____2.  Training should include specific techniques to handle automation. 
 
 
____3.  Definable minimum levels of training must be established. 
 
 
____4.  The evaluator must create a balanced level during the checkride to ensure manual 
 skills are demonstrated to balance the use of automation.   
 
 
____5.  There must be satisfactory demonstration of manual skills before allowing the 
 use of automation. 
 
____6.  Require the use of manual skills after automation has been mastered. 
 
 
____7.  The instructor and examiner must ensure the automation is used as a tool, not a 
 crutch. 
 
 
____8.  Training in cockpit automation should be separated from aircraft specific training 
 and introduced at some later point in training. 
 
 
____9.  Recurrent and subsequent training should include incrementally more difficult 
and complex scenarios, teaching more efficient and appropriate uses of automation.   
 
____10.  Trainers must be trained to teach the specific automation installed in the aircraft 
 to include the conceptual fundamentals of how the system software determines 
 courses of action in specific situations. 
 
 
____11.  Intensify training in failure mode management.  Automation should be used as a 
 supplement to the primary tools in the aircraft, never as a substitute. 
 
 
____12.  Courseware development must be upgraded to allow for maximized training.   
 
 
____13.  The training community must develop internet based interactive training 
 modules to prepare the student prior to his arrival at the training site. 
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TABLE II 
 
ROUND 3 RANKING OF DOMINANT IDEAS BY THE DELPHI PANEL 
 
Idea    Scores Received  Total  Mean 
 
 
Idea    Scores Received  Total  Mean 
 
1.  0,5,0,3,1,1,0,2,5,0,5,4,2,2,6,3  39  2.4375 
2.  5,4,4,0,3,2,3,4,6,7,7,6,2,6,2,6  67  4.1875 
3.  6,3,7,3,6,6,6,4,7,4,3,6,6,7,6,4  84  5.2500 
4.  0,0,0,3,1,5,0,0,0,2,2,5,1,6,2,3  30  1.8750 
5.  7,6,5,7,6,5,6,6,7,7,6,7,7,6,7,6  101  6.3125 
6.  7,6,1,5,6,6,6,6,6,2,4,5,5,6,5,6  82  5.1250 
7.  7,7,5,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,3,5,5,6,5,6  97  6.0625 
8.  3,6,7,4,6,6,6,5,6,4,5,5,3,6,7,5  84  5.2500 
9.  1,2,3,0,4,7,0,1,6,1,1,0,5,2,3,2  40  2.5000 
10.  5,6,7,7,5,5,5,5,2,5,3,3,4,6.7,4  79  4.9375 
11.  6,3,3,7,6,0,7,4,3,7,6,4,5,2,6,3  72  4.5000 
12.  7,4,7,0,7,6,5,5,6,7,0,1,3,6,3,6  73  4.5625 
13.  7,2,4,5,7,6,7,4,6,5,0,3,5,3,6,6  76  4.7500 
14.  5,3,7,0,6,5,4,4,3,4,0,4,5,6,5,3  64  4.0000 
 
 
Solution 
 
1.  5,4,6,7,5,7,7,4,6,6,7,4,4,4,7,7  90  5.6250 
2.  6,6,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,4,7,6  104  6.5000 
3.  4,5,7,7,7,6,6,4,7,7,7,5,4,6,2,7  91  5.6875 
4.  7,7,7,7,6,6,7,7,7,4,7,5,3,6,2,5  93  5.8125 
5.  4,7,7,3,5,6,5,5,5,4,7,6,6,2,3,5  80  5.0000 
6.  0,5,5,4,1,4,1,2,7,7,1,6,2,6,6,4  81  3.8125 
7.  7,6,7,7,7,7,6,6,7,3,7,5,7,2,7,6  97  6.0625  
8.  1,2,0,0,1,1,0,1,2,2,0,1,7,2,1,2  23  1.4375 
9.  7,5,7,7,6,6,5,6,6,5,7,5,3,6,5,6  92  5.7500 
10.  7,3,6,7,5,6,6,4,6,7,0,4,7,2,7,6  83  5.1875 
11  7,6,7,7,6,6,6,6,7,5,7,4,1,6,5,3  89  5.5625 
12.  0,4,7,7,6,6,3,2,7,7,7,6,4,6,6,1  79  4.9375 
13.  3,4,7,3,5,6,5,3,7,3,0,5,5,3,6,3  68  4.2500   
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TABLE III  
 
 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS’ RATING OF FINDINGS 
 
 
NUMERICAL DATA 
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TABLE III 
 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS’ RATING OF FINDINGS 
 
 
Idea     Mean   Rank Order 
 
5.    6.3125      1 
7.    6.0625      2 
3.    5.2500      3 
 8.    5.250      4 
 6.    5.125      5 
 10.    4.9375      6 
 13.    4.7500      7 
12.    4.5625      8 
 11.    4.5000      9 
 2.    4.1875    10 
 14.    4.0000    11 
 9.    2.5000    12 
 1.    2.4375    13 
 4.    1.875    14 
 
Solution 
 
 2    6.5000      1 
 7    6.0625      2 
 4    5.8125      3 
 9    5.7500      4 
 3    5.6875      5 
 1    5.6250      6 
 11    5.5625      7 
 10    5.1875      8 
 5    5.0000      9 
 12    4.9375    10 
 13    4.2500    11 
 6    3.8125    12 
 8    1.4375    13 
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